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ABSTRACT 
 
The Time Tradeoff (TTO) method is used to calculate the quality adjustment of the 
Quality Adjusted Life Year, and is therefore an important element in the calculation of 
the benefits of medical interventions. New specifications of TTO, known as ‘lead time’ 
TTO and ‘lag time’ TTO, have been developed to overcome methodological issues of 
the ‘classic’ TTO. In the lead time TTO, ill-health is explicitly placed in the future, after a 
period of good health, while in lag time TTO a health state starts immediately and is 
followed by a ‘lag time’ of good health. In this study, we take advantage of these timing 
properties of lead and lag time TTO. In particular, we use data from a previous study 
that employed lead and lag time TTO to estimate their implied discounting parameters. 
We show that individuals prefer being ill later, rather than now, with larger per-period 
discount rates for longer durations of the health states.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
It is uncertain whether values derived from preference elicitation tasks partly reflect, not 
just the value of a health state, but also the preferences individuals have for health 
impairments to occur now or in the future. Time preferences reflect the value given to 
the timing of an event (MacKeigan et al., 2003). Any preference for timing, regardless 
whether it reflects a preference for events occurring sooner or later, has large 
consequences for the valuation of heath states and by extension for the assessment of the 
benefit of medical interventions with Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). The quality 
adjustment of the QALY represents preferences for health states, which can be elicited 
with the popular Time Tradeoff (TTO) method. Recently, a new specification of this 
method, called lead time TTO, has been developed, which explicitly places health states 
in the future, after a so called ‘lead-time’ of good health (for a complete introduction into 
the methodology see (Robinson and Spencer, 2006; Devlin et al., 2011; Versteegh et al., 
2012; Attema et al., forthcoming a; Devlin et al., forthcoming)). If individuals derive 
greater utility from good health now and poor health later, the valuation of a life profile 
where a health state occurs later in life (lead time TTO) is likely to yield higher utility 
than a life profile where the same health state, with the same duration, starts in the 
present, rather than in the future, and is followed, rather than preceded, by good health 
(lag time TTO).  
  
Although credits for the lead time TTO are often given to Robinson and Spencer (2006), 
it had already been around for at least more than a decade. In 1995, Dolan and Gudex  
published an article aiming to disentangle time preference from duration effects in TTO. 
Their experimental approach was an application of lead and lag time TTO, although they 
did not denote it as such, and their purpose was not to overcome the problem of TTO 
regarding health states worse than death, which was the main motivation of the study by 
Robinson and Spencer (2006). Thus, lead and lag time TTO may be new as valuation 
methods for health states, but have been applied before in the measurement of time 
preferences.  
 
A first direct measurement of the discounting function for health benefits under certainty 
was undertaken by Cairns (1992). The method used for this measurement involves the 
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increase of days in ill-health that a respondent is willing to accept in order to obtain a 
delay of the onset of this spell of ill-health (delay of illness method [DOIM]). Then, one 
has to specify a particular parametric shape of the discounting function and assume that 
there is no discounting within the period of ill-health, which allows one to analytically 
solve for the discounting parameter. The Direct Method (Attema et al., forthcoming b) is 
comparable to the DOIM, but needs no parametric assumptions. Furthermore, it does 
not have to assume there is no discounting during the period of ill-health, which causes 
discontinuities in the discounting function. Olsen (1994) proposed to measure 
discounting using two different horizons in the classic TTO. In particular, this approach 
predicts lower TTO scores for longer durations because individuals are thought to more 
easily give up life years that occur farther in the future. However, in addition to having to 
assume a particular parametric shape of the discounting function, this method is not able 
to capture discounting for the power function. 
 
In addition to the use of two classic TTOs, one may also consider using one lead and one 
lag time TTO to elicit time preferences, as was applied by Dolan and Gudex (1995). An 
advantage of this approach is that it is able to also capture power discounting, alongside 
the measurement of health state utilities by means of a procedure that is uniform for 
better and worse than dead health states. Here, this approach is applied and used to 
present empirical support for the hypothesis that individuals prefer being ill later, rather 
than now, at least for the observed illness durations. We do so by measuring time 
preferences using a study in which both lead and lag time TTO were applied (Versteegh 
et al., 2012). 
 
 
2. DISCOUNTING IN TTO 
 
Within the assumptions of the generalized QALY model, TTO scores represent the value 
of a health state V(Q) by the amount of years, T-x, an individual is willing to trade off. 
Thus, for lead time TTO in a 20 year timeframe, with 10 years in full health (FH) and 10 
years in the impaired health state (α), assuming no discounting, the utility equation is: 
 
)()(10)(10 FHxVVFHV =+ α , (1) 
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which can be solved for V(α), giving: 
 
10
10)()( −= FHxVV α . (2) 
 
However, if we assume individuals have a preference for timing, life years will be 
weighted for time preferences according to the function W(t), resulting in equation 3: 
 
)()()()10()()10( FHVxWVWFHVW =+ α . (3) 
 
The utility equation for lag time TTO is identical, be it that V(FH) and V(α) are placed in 
reversed order. 
 
A crucial issue is the identification of the shape of the discount function W(t), or, in 
other words, to measure how individuals value timing. The discount function can adopt 
different parametric shapes. Two popular parametric families are the exponential family 
(implying constant discounting) and the power family (implying hyperbolic discounting, 
i.e., decreasing discount rates over time). The exponential family can take the following 
form1: 
 
cbetW rt += −)( , (4) 
 
where r is the discount rate and t the amount of years. Because W(t) is unique up to scale 
and location, we can freely fix b and c. For convenience, we set these values such that 
W(0)=1 and W(20)=1. This holds for )1(1 20reb −−−= and )1(1 20rec −−= . The power 
function, instead, can be expressed as2: 
 
cbttW s +=)( , (5) 
 
with the power indicating the degree of hyperbolic discounting. For this function, we 
obtain W(0)=0 and W(20)=1 for the parameter values ( )sb 201=  and c = 0. 
 
                                               
1 And W(T)=b*t+c for r=0. 
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By substituting one of the discount functions given in equations 4 and 5 into equation 3, 
we get the discounted utility functions for lead time TTO (and the same can be done for 
lag time TTO). Then, the value of r or s can be varied until V(α) is the same for lead and 
lag time TTO. See the appendix for the complete derivation of the discounted utility 
functions. 
  
3. METHOD 
 
The linear QALY models predicts equal values for two health profiles which are identical 
in all aspects but the onset of the ill-health period. In the study by Dolan and Gudex 
(1995), lead and lag time TTO profiles were presented to respondents, which were 
identical except for the onset of disease. Given that the linear QALY model predicts 
equal outcomes for those profiles, the “relative preferences over [the two]… scenarios 
can be seen as tradeoffs between outcomes occurring at different points in time and thus 
from these responses each respondent’s time preference rate for health could be 
estimated” (Dolan and Gudex, 1995, p.292). Of course, other factors than time 
preferences may cause differences between lead and lag time TTO, such as loss aversion, 
because good health is attained after a period of illness in lag time TTO; whereas, in lead 
time TTO it is lost. Dolan and Gudex (1995) tested several TTO specifications, for 
example a TTO with a total duration of 10 years, with 9 years lead [lag] time and 1 year 
disease time. We will denote this approach the ‘onset of disease method’ (ODM). 
 
3.1. Dataset 
 
We used data from another study, which applied lead and lag time TTO as valuation 
methods in an online sample of 6222 respondents, reflecting the Dutch general 
population3. Several TTO methods (see table 1) were applied to 100 Dutch EQ-5D-5L 
health states. The EQ-5D-5L consists of 5 dimensions of health (mobility, self care, usual 
activities, pain/discomfort and anxiety/depression) and five level answer categories, 
where level ‘1’ represents absence of problems and level ‘5’ represents extreme problems 
on that particular health dimension. Health states can be described with numbers for ease 
of use in reporting. A health state description ‘11211’ signifies a health profile with 
                                                                                                                                       
2 And W(T)=b*ln(t)+c for r=0. 
3 The details of this study and of the TTO procedures are presented in a companion paper (Versteegh et al., 
2012). 
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absence of health impairments in all dimensions, represented by ‘1’, except for slight 
problems in ‘usual activities’, represented by ‘2’ in the third digit location. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The study reported that, in the 20 year time frame, lag time TTO values were always 
lower than lead time TTO values. In the 15 year time frame (with only 5 years disease 
duration rather than 10 years disease duration in the 20 year time frame), this difference 
was much smaller and in 18 out of 100 health states lead time values were higher than lag 
time values (i.e., time preferences were negative).  
 
3.2. ODM 
 
The ODM offers an ‘implied discount rate’, as the difference between the two valuation 
methods is interpreted as an expression of preferences for timing. We applied the ODM 
to the mean TTO values for each health state, using both exponential discounting and 
power discounting. Hence, we generated 100 discount parameter estimates for the 15 
year time frame, as well as 100 discount parameter estimates for the 20 year time frame 
for both the exponential discounting and the power model.  
 
The mean discount parameter ( r  and s ) of each TTO type (a, b, c or d) was applied to all 
100 health states of the relevant TTO type. The fit of r  and s  was assessed with the 
root of the mean squared error (RMSE). To clarify the procedure we provide a short 
example in table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
Without discounting, the difference between lead time TTO values and lag time TTO 
values, expressed in terms of RMSE, was 0.189 for the 15 year time frame and 0.273 for 
the 20 year time frame. Mean time preferences were positive, for both exponential and 
power discounting, suggesting that respondents consider profiles of health in which ill-
health starts in the future to be more desirable than profiles of health in which ill-health 
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starts immediately. Both exponential and power discounting indicated more per-period 
discounting for the longer disease duration. Furthermore, both parametric families 
resulted in an equal but still sizable RMSE, suggesting that time preferences did not fully 
explain the differences between lead and lag time TTO, or at least not when the same 
average implied discount rate is used for all health states.  
 
4.1. Exponential discounting 
 
For the disease duration of 5 years (a and c from table 1) we found a mean yearly 
discount rate of 0.015 (sd = 0.016). For the disease duration of 10 years (b and d) we 
found a mean yearly discount rate of 0.054 (sd = 0.019). RMSE was 0.13 (compared to 
0.189 without correcting for mean discount value) and 0.06 (compared to 0.273 without 
discounting) for the 5 and 10 year disease durations, respectively. There was no clear 
increasing or decreasing relationship between discount rates and health state severity. As 
shown in figure 1, time preferences were negative for 18 health states for the 5 year 
disease duration. The health states did not share common features, such as impairments 
on specific dimensions of health, to explain this phenomenon.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
4.2. Hyperbolic discounting 
 
We found a mean power coefficient of 0.925 (sd = 0.079) for the 5 year disease duration 
and a mean power coefficient of 0.697 (sd = 0.089) for the 10 year disease duration. 
RMSE was 0.129 (compared to 0.189 without correcting for mean discount value) and 
0.06 (compared to 0.273 without discounting), respectively. There was no clear 
relationship between the magnitude of the power coefficients and health state severity. 
Figure 2 shows the hyperbolic discount values for all 100 health states. For the 5 year 
disease duration, 18 health states were associated with negative time preferences (i.e., 
powers greater than 1).  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
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On average, individuals displayed positive time preferences for health states, indicating 
that for the disease durations tested here, respondents preferred ill-health to occur later 
rather than sooner. These results seemingly contradict the findings of Dolan and Gudex 
(1995), who found negative discount rates for their disease duration of 1 year, also using 
the ODM. However, the latter observation may indicate a tendency for lower discount 
rates when the disease duration is shorter, which is in line with the finding in our study 
that discounting is higher for a 10 year disease duration than for a 5 year disease duration. 
In terms of preferences for illness, it seems that individuals want to get a health state 
‘over with’ if it is short-lasting (negative time preferences (Loewenstein, 1987; 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1991)), and prefer a delayed onset when duration is longer, at 
least under certainty.  
 
Several attempts have been performed to estimate time preference for health outcomes 
under certainty.4 This literature highlights the wide variety of discounting estimates, 
which are highly influenced by procedural differences. The estimates vary between 
extremely high discount rates (above 100% per year, (Chapman, 1996; Chapman et al., 
1999; Ganiats et al., 2000)) to negative discount rates (Redelmeier and Heller, 1993; 
Dolan and Gudex, 1995; Ganiats et al., 2000). Moreover, the type of health state under 
consideration also seems to affect results. Ganiats et al. (2000), for example, found 
considerable differences between time preference in the case of headaches and 
chickenpox.  
 
The consistent results found in our own study should thus be considered in the light of 
the diverse discounting literature which is, in itself, less consistent in findings. Due to the 
variability in procedures of eliciting discount values, it is difficult to conclude on the 
exact direction and size of the influence of time preferences on health state valuations, 
but there seems to be some consistency that they are influenced by time preferences.  
 
Our study was limited by the mode of administration of the TTO study. In the 
companion paper (Versteegh et al., 2012), we indicated that the quality data of an online 
                                               
4 In addition, attempts have been made to elicit discounting under uncertainty (e.g. using the certainty 
equivalence method, e.g. van Osch et al., 2004; Stiggelbout et al., 1994; Martin et al., 2000) or using saved 
life years (e.g. (Cropper et al., 1991; 1992; 1994; Cairns and van der Pol, 1997a; 1997b; Lazaro Alquezar et 
al., 2001)), but these are distorted by risk (certainty equivalence) or equity (life saving) considerations, and, 
hence, are outside the scope of this paper. 
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TTO is lower than that of a TTO with interviewer guidance present, likely because not 
all individuals properly understand the task, or prefer to complete the task quickly, rather 
than thoroughly. Conducting this interview in a face-to-face setting would improve data-
quality and strengthen our conclusions concerning time preferences. Finally, the current 
design was a between-subject design where respondents participated in either the lead 
time TTO or the lag time TTO. A within-subject design would also strengthen 
conclusions.   
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APPENDIX 1: 
 
The full utility equation for lead time TTO (illustrative for the 20 year time frame), 
corrected for exponential discounting, is: 
 
)()()()()()( 102010 FHVcbeVcbecbeFHVcbe rtrrr +=−−+++ −−−− α
. (A1)
 
 
For lag time TTO, it is:  
 
)()()()()()( 102010 FHVcbeFHVcbecbeVcbe rtrrr +=−−+++ −−−− α
, (A2)
 
 
which, after scaling V(FH)=1, can be rewritten to solve for V(α)  as equation A3 for lead 
time TTO: 
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and equation A4 for lag time TTO: 
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For power discounting, we obtain the following equations. For lead time TTO: 
 
)()()()1020()()10( FHVcbtVcbcbFHVcb ssss +=−−+++ α
; (A5)
 
 
and for lag time TTO: 
 
)()()()1020()()10( FHVcbtFHVcbcbVcb ssss +=−−+++ α
, (A6) 
 
which can again be solved for V(α), resulting in equation A7 and A8, for lead and lag 
time TTO, respectively: 
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Table 1) TTO specifications in the dataset 
 TTO type Total timeframe Onset of disease Duration of disease 
a Lead time TTO 15 years after 10 years 5 years 
b Lead time TTO 20 years after 10 years 10 years 
c Lag time TTO 15 years immediately 5 years 
d Lag time TTO 20 years immediately 10 years 
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Table 2) Example of ODM for a 15 year time frame     
 TTO type 
EQ-5D-5L 
Health state (α) 
Mean  
xV(FH)  
Utility 
value V(α) 
(TTO value 
- 10 / 5) 
Implied r (at which 
V(α)-a = V(α)-c 
using exponential 
discounting)       Mean r 
Corrected 
utility 
values for 
mean r 
RMSE 
of 
corrected 
values 
a Lead time TTO 52555 10.3 0.1 0.014 
c Lag time TTO 52555 8.9 -0.2 
0.028 
0.05 
a Lead time TTO 25551 10.1 0.0 0.07 
c Lag time TTO 25551 9.0 -0.2 
0.02 
0.024 
0.03 
0.038 
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Figure 1: yearly discount rates for all 100 health states
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Figure 2: Hyperbolic discount values for all 100 health states
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